Taxpayers shelter income from taxation both through illegal evasion and legal avoidance. This tax sheltering creates a difference between a household's actual income and what it reports to the tax authorities. While tax sheltering is a central concern for designing a tax system, the private nature of this behavior complicates evaluating the magnitude and determinants of such behavior. In this paper, we combine zip-code level data on reported income from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Census Bureau to examine three types of determinants of tax sheltering: (1) tax policy variables, including tax rates and the compliance generated third-party reporting of income; (2) political attitudes towards taxation; and (3) demographics. Our estimates suggest that higher tax rates increase the amount of tax sheltering; places with more self-employed people also shelter more income. In terms of political support, our results suggest that places with voters who are either more conservative or less supportive of tax increases actually shelter less income. We also find that minorities shelter more income from taxation and both older and more highly-educated households shelter less income from taxation.
Introduction
Tax sheltering is a combination of tax evasion and tax avoidance that reduces what households report as income on their tax returns relative to their true incomes. Tax evasion is the illegal underreporting of taxable income; tax avoidance refers to deviations between taxable income and true income because households are not taxed on some forms of income (e.g., interest on tax-exempt bonds). The paucity of data on tax compliance impedes measuring the determinants of tax sheltering behavior. Part of the reason for the lack of data is obvious: tax evasion is illegal so people are not eager to reveal such behaviors. While tax avoidance behavior is legal, tax returns do not include information on all possible forms of tax sheltering. In this paper, we combine Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data for the 2001 tax year reported at the zipcode level with zip-code level data from the 2000 decennial Census to examine differences in income reported to the IRS and household income reported to the Census. Our main variable of interest is the ratio of adjusted gross income per tax return to average household income reported in the Census in a given zip-code area.
We use the geographic aspect of this measure of tax sheltering to examine the determinants of tax sheltering. Tax sheltering could depend on both financial incentives and attitudes towards taxation. The financial incentives to shelter income depend on the parameters of the tax code, including tax rates, enforcement efforts by the government, and tax rules that determine how income will be taxed. For tax evasion, theoretical predictions about the effect of higher tax rates depend on how potential fines interact with the tax rate. In addition, the opportunity to evade taxes may differ across types of income; for example, self employment may provide opportunities to underreport income. For tax avoidance, higher marginal tax rates should induce more tax avoidance behavior. One difficulty in estimating the effects of tax incentives on tax sheltering is measuring exogenous variation in tax rates faced by households.
To overcome this concern, we focus on regional discontinuities created by state borders: we estimate models of bordering counties in different states in hopes of isolating differences in tax incentives.
Attitudes towards taxation can also affect tax sheltering behavior. Political attitudes and engagement is one set of attitudes that might affect tax sheltering. While attitudes may be related to political party affiliation, one concern with party affiliation is that the underlying political ideology for a party can vary across place. Therefore, we focus on the Poole-Rosenthal measures of political ideology, based on Congressional voting records, to capture regional variation in political attitudes towards taxation. We examine voter turnout to capture general differences across place in political engagement. In addition to political attitudes, demographic differences, such as income, education, age, and race, may also influence attitudes towards tax sheltering.
The difference between income reported to the tax authorities and true household income has important implications for the amount of tax revenues and the efficacy with which these revenues are collected. While in some instances tax avoidance behavior reflects households responding to incentives built into the tax system, both tax evasion and tax avoidance affect tax collections. Understanding tax sheltering can help policymakers improve the design of the tax system and tax administration. As we will discuss in more detail below, in terms of the economic distortions created by the tax system, Chetty (2008) shows that the deadweight loss of taxation can depend on a combination of the elasticity of taxable income and the elasticity of total income with respect to the tax rate. Tax sheltering creates a difference between these two elasticities; thus, estimating the elasticity of tax sheltering with respect to the tax rate has implications for the efficiency effects of the tax system. The amount of tax evasion and tax avoidance also affects the distribution of tax collections across households.
To preview our main results, our estimates suggest that higher tax rates increase the amount of tax sheltering; places with more self-employed people also shelter more income. In terms of political support, our results suggest that places with voters who are either more conservative or less supportive of tax increases actually shelter less income. We also find that minorities shelter more income from taxation and both older and more highly-educated households shelter less income from taxation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some theoretical background on tax sheltering, efficiency measures of income taxes, and the geography of tax burdens. Section III describes the advantages and disadvantages of the data that we use to explore tax sheltering. In section IV, we outline our empirical approach. We cut the data two ways in order to focus on different elements of tax sheltering. First, we focus on zip-code level data, both within California and nationally. Second, we compare tax sheltering in counties that border each other but are in adjacent states. By focusing on these bordered pairs, we hope to control for many factors that are the same across counties (e.g., they are in the same or similar labor markets) and isolated variables that differ across counties (e.g., marginal tax rates differ due to differences in state laws. Section V presents our results and section VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. Background and Theory
This section provides background information on several strands of the tax literature that are related to our study of the geography of the ratio of income reported to the IRS to income reported to the Census. From the outset, we want to be clear that the data do not allow us to separate evasion (illegal behavior) from avoidance (legal behavior) so that our results should not be construed as narrowly referring to tax evasion. After briefly distinguishing tax evasion and tax avoidance, we discuss the canonical models of the determinants of each behavior. Since our emphasis on geography lends itself to considering political and demographic factors, we review some theories of tax compliance that go beyond the standard economic model. In addition to being related to the literature on tax sheltering, our empirical analysis also has implications for recent work on the geography of tax burdens and the measurement of the efficiency cost of taxation.
II.A. Overview of Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Households can evade the individual income tax by underreporting income, overstating deductions or exemptions, or (in the extreme) by not filing a tax return when required by law. 2 Individual income taxes account for about two-thirds of the aggregate tax gap of $290 billion (after adjusting for expected collections from audits) or 13.7 percent of the statutory tax liability. Due to administrative features such as employer withholding of taxes on wages and informational reports by payees of some types of income, the estimated 1 While each of these forms of evasion seems straightforward, the complexity of the tax law can lead to a fine line between willful noncompliance and honest mistakes in interpretation in some reporting decisions. 2 These estimates are based on a complicated extrapolation using data collected through a series of extensive audits of a sample of tax returns.
compliance rate varies considerably by type of income. Self employment, rental income, and farm income tend to have considerably lower compliance rates.
As with tax evasion, the goal of tax avoidance is to reduce the household's tax liability without causing a significant distortion to the household's consumption bundle (other than through the effect of having more cash). The critical distinction between the two concepts is that evasion is illegal activity such that the authorities can compel taxpayers to pay the evaded tax;
avoidance behavior is legal activity that permits a taxpayer to reduce his or her tax liability.
Examples of tax avoidance include investing in tax-exempt state and local bonds and deferring the realization of capital gains income; in these examples, alternative investment strategies would have yielded a higher tax burden but the tax authorities cannot dictate investment strategy.
Of course, there are grey areas between evasion and avoidance since tax law is open to
interpretation. An example is the restriction against deducting interest payments on debt if the proceeds to the debt are invested in tax-exempt bonds; while this tracing rule is easy to write down, it is difficult to implement since the use of the proceeds from debt are not always clear.
Economists tend not to estimate the overall magnitude of tax avoidance since the precise definition of what behaviors constitute avoidance is not possible. At what point does a behavior move from the category of pure tax avoidance into the category of real behavior that reduces the income tax liability? For example, increasing the level of savings in response to tax preferences for household saving changes real behavior by changing the timing of consumption; in contrast, merely shifting the form of savings in response to such incentives seems like tax avoidance.
As stressed by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) 
II.B. Incentives for Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance
The canonical economic model of tax evasion is Allingham and Sandmo's (1972) model of a taxpayer who chooses an amount of tax to evade in the presence of a fixed probability of detection and a proportional penalty based on the amount of tax evaded. 3 Evading taxes creates a gamble with a payoff that depends on the tax rate, the probability of detection, and the fine upon being detected. Taxpayers with higher risk aversion are less likely to evade taxes.
Depending on how risk aversion changes with income, the level of income can also affect the amount of tax evasion. If relative risk aversion is increasing, decreasing or constant with income, then evasion as a fraction of income will decrease, increase, or stay constant with income. The effect of the tax rate depends on the specific formulation of the penalty. Allingham and Sandmo assume that the penalty is proportional to the understatement of income, which leads to the prediction that higher tax rates will lead to a substitution effect that increases evasion; as pointed out by Yitzhaki (1974) , if the penalty is proportional to the tax evaded, then the tax rate will not have this substitution effect since the tax rate affects both the costs and benefits of evasion.
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While models of tax evasion emphasize risk aversion, audit and detection probabilities, these factors do not play a role in the tax avoidance decision since the activity is legal. Instead of relying on risk and punishment as limiting factors, models of tax avoidance (see Slemrod, 2001) appeal to the notion of taxpayers having access to an "avoidance technology." The avoidance technology might include the ability to take compensation in a tax-advantaged form, such as untaxed fringe benefits, or to borrow with tax deductible interest to invest in lightly taxed assets.
It is natural to think of the marginal cost of avoidance increasing with the amount of avoidance so that taxpayers do not want to avoid all taxation. Since the marginal tax rate captures the marginal benefit to tax avoidance, an increase in the tax rate should increase the amount of tax avoidance. Stiglitz (1985) presents a model of tax avoidance that suggests that taxpayers have more opportunity to avoid taxes on capital income than labor income. His main point is that inconsistencies in the treatment of different types of capital income create opportunities to eliminate taxes on capital income but various tax rules and market frictions limit the ability of taxpayers to offset fully their labor income using these strategies. Higher tax rates increase the incentive to engage in these strategies but the tax savings must be weighed against the non-tax costs of sheltering income.
Empirical studies of tax evasion have focused on several types of data. Macroeconomic data has been used for aggregate measures of the tax gap (e.g., the measures mentioned above 4 Subsequent models of tax evasion have suggested numerous alternative formulations, including making the probability of audit and detection depend on reported income and allowing evasion to be chosen jointly with the amount of income earned. Taxpayers will react to endogenous audit probabilities by avoiding actions that will increase the probability of detection.
that Slemrod reports on overall tax evasion). Individual-level data on audited tax returns have been the subject of a number of studies (see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998 , for a survey of such studies). The advantage of using data on audited tax return is that measured evasion is more likely to capture willful noncompliance with the tax laws. The disadvantage of such studies is that the evasion measure only captures evasion that can be detected by a tax auditor.
These data are also limited to data that can be found on tax returns so that they are not terribly rich in demographic data. Given the difficulties in measuring tax evasion, other studies have resorted to experimental and survey data on tax evasion.
The studies of audited tax returns have yielded mixed evidence on the effects of both tax rates and income on the amount of tax evasion. For measuring the effects of tax rates on evasion, one of the challenges (especially in cross-sectional data) is that the tax rate is correlated with income so that it is difficult to separate tax and income effects. Since we focus on the proportion of true income that is reported to the IRS, our empirical approach estimates the determinants of budget shares for tax sheltering rather than the determinants of the absolute amount of tax sheltering. Using data on audited tax returns, Christian (1994) finds some evidence that higher-income households report a higher fraction of their income than lowerincome households report.
The closest antecedent to our empirical strategy is the work of Dubin and Wilde (1988) , and Beron, Tauchen and Witte (1992; hereafter, BTW) . Both of these studies use a special dataset created by the IRS for tax returns from 1969 that are aggregated to the three-digit zipcode level (a strategy that yields a cross-sectional dataset with roughly 800 observations, depending on the audit class considered especially for low-and middle-income households. They also find that even controlling for audit probabilities, self employment and unemployment reduce compliance and manufacturing employment increases compliance; they report that for several audit classes, the percentage nonwhite reduces compliance.
BTW examine the determinants of reported income and tax liability, controlling for income reported to the Census as a measure of 'true' income. Our empirical specifications will follow a similar spirit; however, our data are not broken down by audit class and we do not have information on audit probabilities. They report evidence that higher education is associated with lower reported income and that an increase in female-headed households increases compliance.
They do not find evidence of racial characteristics mattering for reported income or tax liability.
One criticism of BTW is their narrow interpretation of their results as being about tax evasion.
Evasion is only one behavior that could affect reported income once one has controlled for 'true' income.
II.C. Social Identity, Geography and Tax Evasion
While the theoretical literature that has grown out of the Allingham and Sandmo framework has yielded many interesting insights into the potential determinants of tax sheltering, Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) report a general consensus among researchers that these models predict much less compliance than observed in the tax systems in many developed countries. The argument is that audit probabilities are too low and the fines too small to generate the high rate of compliance observed in the data. As Slemrod (2007) points out, the overall audit probability does not necessarily reflect the audit probability of returns with underreported tax liability so the theory may have more explanatory power than the consensus suggests.
Nonetheless, the common perception that tax compliance depends on more than just calculations about the payoff to a gamble has lead to research on other social factors that might explain tax compliance.
Experimental methods have provided some opportunities to incorporate this broader set of possible factors in tax compliance. For example, Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992) conclude from their laboratory experiments that tax compliance is higher when taxpayers perceive that they will receive benefits from the taxes collected. Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) conclude that incorporating morals and social dynamics into tax compliance is an underdeveloped area of research. Our focus on regional data provides an avenue for including some broad measures of social dynamics into the tax sheltering story.
Tax evasion and tax avoidance reduces the amount of total revenue that government collects. Some people may justify this activity convincing themselves that government cannot be trusted to spend the money wisely on public goods. Others may view tax collection as collecting revenue that will be redistributed to others. A recent empirical literature has examined what factors determine support for government redistribution. Luttmer (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) emphasize the role of group altruism as a determinant of the support for redistribution. Put simply, people are more likely to support redistribution when the beneficiaries look like them. This is a core argument in Alesina and Glaeser's work explaining why Sweden has a more generous safety net than the United States. In an attempt to address this issue, in our empirical specifications we include various demographic characteristics.
The geography of tax sheltering can affect the ability of the federal government to redistribute resources by levying a progressive income tax. As a general rule in fiscal federalism, redistribution is more effectively carried out by higher levels of government than lower levels of government. Albouy (2008) emphasizes that a federal income taxed based on nominal incomes places a heavier burden on people in high-cost areas than it places on residents of low-cost areas, holding the real incomes constant across place. While he focuses on how these tax differences create incentives for migration and spatial mismatch of people and places, the effective difference in taxation across place depends on propensities for tax sheltering as well as the interaction between the federal tax schedule and incomes in different places. However, we know relatively little about the distribution of tax sheltering across place.
In addition to social identity, political ideology may affect tax sheltering. A simple hypothesis is that individuals who vote to support higher taxes may act in a consistent way in their personal tax sheltering decisions. Thus, places with more people who support higher taxes may have less tax sheltering. However, other theories are also possible. For example, people who can shelter more income may be more willing to support high taxes since they view taxes as mainly something paid by other people.
II.D. Taxable Income Elasticity, Efficiency, and Tax Sheltering
A substantial literature on the elasticity of taxable income has developed following Feldstein's (1995) work on how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected taxable incomes. One attractive feature of focusing on the taxable income elasticity is the claim that it is a sufficient statistic for calculating the deadweight loss of the tax system; the intuition is that individuals change all margins of behaviors -labor supply, investment, evasion, and avoidance -such that the private marginal cost of the change is the same across all behaviors (see Feldstein, 1999) . In recent work, Chetty (2008) develops more detailed conditions under which the elasticity of taxable income measures the deadweight loss of the tax system. Building on earlier work by Slemrod (e.g., see the survey in Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002 ), Chetty's insight is that not all behavioral adjustments have the same social cost. The social marginal cost of sheltering (e.g., avoidance plus evasion) can differ from the private marginal cost of sheltering when the sheltering behavior creates a transfer of resources between agents. For example, some forms of tax sheltering require paying fees to financial planners; these fees are a cost to the taxpayer but not to society since the financial planner benefits from collecting the fee. In contrast, the social and private costs of distortions of real behavior are arguably relatively similar; a simple example is the lost output from distorting someone's labor supply decision.
Chetty develops a formula for the deadweight loss of taxation that incorporates a weighted average of the elasticity of taxable income (which varies due to both real and sheltering responses) with respect to the tax rate and the elasticity of total income (which varies due to real behaviors but not sheltering activity). The weights on the different elasticities depend on the magnitude of transfer costs associated with tax sheltering. If sheltering involves no transfer costs so that the social and private costs of sheltering are the same, then the elasticity of taxable income is sufficient for measuring the deadweight loss of the income tax. Our estimates of the responsiveness of tax sheltering to the tax rate identify the elasticity of sheltering with respect to the tax rate. The sheltering response captures the difference between the real response and the taxable income response so our estimates provide a sense of the importance of separating the two types of elasticities.
III. Data Challenges and Description
Our approach to exploring the tax gap is relatively straightforward. We compare the zipcode aggregate household income reported on tax returns with the zip-code aggregate household income reported to the Census bureau. The logic of our approach is that income reported to the Census represents a household's "true" income but income reported to the IRS depends on tax sheltering behavior.
This approach has several advantages over previous measures of the tax gap. First, relative to studies that rely on special tax return audits, our sample includes a broader set of households and our measure of the tax gap does not depend on whether the auditor can detect the income discrepancy. Furthermore, tax return data typically do not have information on household characteristics that might be of interest for explaining household behavior. Second, relative to experimental work, our data reflect actual behavior which avoids many of the criticisms endemic to using a laboratory setting to study economic decisions. Third, compared to aggregate measures of the tax gap, we use disaggregated data which allows us to explore some of the determinants of the tax gap; of course, we can only measure these determinants at the zipcode level rather than linking individual characteristics to individual behavior.
To fix ideas, consider the following relationship between reported income for tax purposes and true income:
where AGI is adjusted gross income for tax purposes, Y is true income, A is avoidance activity, E is tax evasion, and ε is a random component that contributes to the difference in the income measures. Tax sheltering is the sum of avoidance (A) and evasion (E). We focus on the ratio of AGI to Y so that our dependent variable captures the fraction of income that is reported to the IRS. One can think of one minus this ratio as the sheltering ratio for each location.
Any measure of the tax gap has its problems and our measure is no exception to this rule.
From the outset, we want to be clear that this measure does not capture evasion as a legal concept. Instead, it captures overall tax sheltering. Nonetheless, as described above, sheltering is of policy interest independent from the narrow issue of tax evasion.
One issue for interpreting the measures of income is that filling out a tax return may frame the definition of income from some Census respondents. In answering the Census question about income, some people might simply report the same income that they reported to the IRS. Some people might never tally their income from sources that they do not report to the IRS. This sort of framing would systematically reduce our measure of the tax sheltering. In the notation from above, this framing concern suggests that some sheltering may be misclassified as true income; this misclassification will lead us to understate the amount of actual tax sheltering.
Retirement savings, in its many different forms, provides an example of how these framing issues might affect any comparison of incomes reported to the IRS and Census. The tax return does not include contributions to tax-advantaged savings accounts (such as 401 (k) plans) and excludes the capital income earned inside these accounts; however, all withdrawals from such accounts are included in taxable income. One could imagine households reporting income gross of contributions to these accounts (i.e., gross salary) to the Census bureau but forgetting to include the year-to-year investment returns in their income. Of course, some financially savvy households might include these investment returns as investment income. If either the contributions or the investment returns are included in the income that is reported to the Census Bureau, then there is a risk of double counting of income if households also include the withdrawals from these accounts as taxable income. Alternatively, some tax-advantaged savings accounts (so-called Roth-styled accounts) allow households to save after-tax earnings without having to report or pay tax on future investment returns. The natural reporting tendency for these accounts would be the same as tax-exempt bond interest: people may fail to report the earnings on these investments as income to the Census (due to framing issues) so that our measure of tax sheltering understates the true amount of tax sheltering.
Compensation that comes through fringe benefits could also create differences between a household's true income and what it reports to the IRS. Employer-provided health insurance is the canonical example. While such coverage has a substantial value, most households probably exclude its value when reporting income. Traditional defined benefit pensions create a host of measurement issues, similar to those discussed with personal retirement accounts.
In some cases, the definition of income may vary for policy reasons without resulting in any behavioral change or even predict a change in other source of income (as would be the case when fringe benefits substitute for cash compensation). One example is the income tax treatment of Social Security benefits. For many households, Social Security benefits are excluded from AGI but are likely to be reported to the Census Bureau as income. This particular difference could create a pattern between age and the ratio of AGI to Census income.
As should be apparent from our focus on AGI, our measure does not capture tax sheltering that occurs through deductions. Thus, tax sheltering strategies involving borrowing with tax deductible interest are outside the scope of our study. As reported above in section II.A., Slemrod (2007) reports that 80 percent of the tax gap comes from understating income rather than overstating deductions. While this statistic offers some comfort for focusing on income before deductions as a measure of tax sheltering, we note that it refers specifically to tax evasion without reference to tax avoidance.
These data are only available at the zip-code aggregate level, instead of the individual level. Working with aggregated data creates a number of concerns. One particular problem with zip codes is that they are designed merely for the convenience of postal delivery. They are not necessarily stable over time, though since we are focusing on cross-sectional data and combining data from two relatively similar years, we expect such changes to be of minor importance for our purposes. Other than respecting state lines, zip codes do not necessarily correspond with other political designations (e.g., towns or counties); of course, these political jurisdictions probably have considerable influence on the drawing of zip-code borders.
By the nature of the Census Bureau's mandate, the Census Bureau is quite concerned with accurately measuring where people live (i.e., their "usual" residence) at the time of the Census survey. 5 A precise measure of where people live is less important for the IRS and one might worry that location is not reported as accurately in the IRS data. One source of concern is that some people, especially high income taxpayers, file tax returns using business addresses or the address of who prepares the tax return. This type of misclassification creates some outliers in our data.
We address this misclassification concern in two ways. First, our dependent variable is the ratio of average AGI per tax return to the average Census income per household instead of simply the ratio of aggregate AGI in a zip code to aggregate Census income in a zip code. The ratio of aggregate incomes is influenced by whether the same households report being in the same zip code area in both datasets. If the misclassified households have the same average income (in both datasets) as the households that report living in the zip code, then by taking the ratio of the averages, we eliminate the influence of people reporting in different locations across the two datasets. 6 Second, the misclassification of where households live may create outliers in the data. For this reason, along with a general concern that outliers may influence our results, we trim the data such that observations in the top and bottom one percent of the distribution are assigned the value of the 99 th and 1 st percentile, respectively.
An important aggregation issue for our purposes is that the Census and the IRS define a "household" differently. One option for dealing with this aggregation issue is to just use total income for the zip code from each data source. The total income has two drawbacks. the ratio of the averages should not be affected much by using data from two different years. A downside to using the ratio of averages is that some Census households may file multiple tax returns; examples include unrelated parties living together in a Census household, married couples who choose the married filing separately (a quite small number of returns for married couples living together), and children who file separately from their parents.
These measurement issues raise several important questions. First, how do they bias our tests? One thing to note is that many of the framing issues where households might follow tax rules in defining income rather than what economists might refer to as overall economic income deal with capital income: tax-exempt bonds, retirement savings, unrealized capital gains, imputed rental value of housing and durables, etc. Second, can we deal with some of these issues by including control variables that are likely to capture regional variation in the importance of various measurement issues?
IV. Empirical Approach
We concentrate on three different cuts at the data that highlight specific hypotheses regarding the determinants of tax sheltering: (1) zip-code level data within the state of California; (2) zip-code level data using a national sample; and (3) matched pairs of counties that share a common border but are in different states. The California data allows us to focus on a particular (large) state and include a broader set of political variables. The national zip-code level sample allows for a broader perspective, especially with respect to the political attitude variables. While focusing on bordering counties in different states reduces the size of our sample, this sample provides a cleaner test for tax effects since the variation in our measure of the tax rate comes from interstate variation in tax law.
Our core regressions take the form:
Income Ratio jl = geography l + B 1 *Demographics jl + B 2 *X jl + U jl where the income ratio is the ratio of average AGI per tax return to average household income from the Census on various control variables and a set of approach-specific variables. 7 As we discussion below, geography represents a vector of fixed effects. These fixed effects will differ depending on the sample. Demographics for zip code j in geographical area l is a vector of zip- Many of these variables capture standard demographic controls that might reflect attitudes towards the tax system or differential access to sheltering opportunities. The ratio of tax returns to the number of Census households is the ratio of the denominators of the two variables used to construct the dependent variable. The rationale for including this variable is that it might reflect places that have an unusually high or low number of tax returns per Census household. For example, this variable depends on the number of children who file separate tax returns and the number of Census households with multiple families. One would expect the estimated effect of this ratio to be negative from the mechanical effect of having more tax returns for the same amount of total households. This variable also captures (albeit roughly) variation in whether households much file tax returns. Since non-filing households have low income, an increase in such households in a zip code (which is a decrease in the ratio of tax returns to the households) will tend to increase the reported income ratio. 8 The percentage of the workforce that is self employed should capture an increase in the opportunities for tax sheltering if the self employed have more tax sheltering opportunities.
We recognize that the key regressions reported in this paper are "ecological regressions".
Ideally we would have access to micro data with geographical identifiers. Instead, we have access to zip-code level data and we seek to interpret the results as if we can recover "micro parameters" based on these regressions. 9 Our ability to make inferences about household behavior based on such data hinges on the absence of demographic interaction effects. For example, if the true data generating process is that highly-educated Hispanics engage in tax avoidance while less-educated Hispanics do not and highly-educated blacks do not engage in tax avoidance while less-educated blacks do engage in such activity, we could not recover such interactions terms between ethnicity and education. In order for our aggregated approach to recover micro relationships, we need the demographic effects in equation (1) The relationship between voting for higher taxes and sheltering income could come from two distinct channels. Ideology provides one reason to expect voting and tax sheltering to be related. People who vote for higher taxes may have an ideological bent that favors larger government and this ideology may influence their personal decisions. In other words, perhaps, liberals are willing to put their money where their mouths (or, at least, their votes) are. This mechanism suggests a positive correlation between the income ratio and voting for higher taxes.
A more cynical mechanism for this relationship would be that it is less costly to vote for a higher tax rate if one has access to more tax sheltering opportunities. This self-interested mechanism suggests that causality runs from tax sheltering to voting: a higher reported income ratio will induce voting against higher taxes.
We use three California ballot initiatives to identify tax ideology: (1) Proposition 167 in 1992; (2) Proposition 186 in 1994; and (3) Proposition 217 in 1996. None of these propositions received a majority vote. While the three propositions differed in specifics, they all would have increased income tax rates, especially for high income households:
(1) Proposition 167 in November 1992, raises top income tax rates, and repeals the 1991 sales tax increase.
(2) Proposition 186 in November 1994 the California Health Security Act, would have instituted a "single payer" health care system for California. This measure promises generous medical, dental, vision, mental health and long term care benefits to all state residents. Benefits would be financed by income tax increases (2.5 percent for all individuals and an additional 2.5 percent for those with incomes above $250,000; $500,000 for couples), payroll taxes of between 4.4 percent and 8.9 percent per employer depending on the number of persons employed, and $1 per pack surcharge on cigarettes.
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(3) Proposition 217 in November 1996 would have reinstated for 1996 and subsequent tax years the 10 percent and 11 percent income tax rates on individuals' taxable income over $115,000 and $230,000, respectively, and joint taxpayers' income over $230,000 and $460,000, respectively. The state would have apportioned about half the revenue from these increases to local governments and about half to schools and community colleges. The state would have been prohibited from further reducing the local agencies' proportionate share of local property taxes. This proposition would have prevented the state from lowering the tax rates on higher income brackets without a vote of the people.
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A key feature of these various votes is that they are highly positively correlated. The pairwise correlations between the votes all exceed 0.80. In order to create a parsimonious way to include the information from these votes in the regression, we use the average vote in favor of the proposition as an overall measure of political support for higher taxes. 
IV.C. Border Pairs Approach to Measuring Tax Sheltering
While we can include the state marginal tax rate in the national regressions, some of the variation in the tax rate arises from intrastate differences in income across zip codes. Also, within a state, tax sheltering behavior could vary for many reasons that we cannot control for in our specifications. To maximize the value of interstate variation in the data, we follow a similar empirical strategy to Holmes (1998) , who exploits a regression discontinuity approach to study the role of state labor regulation in determining manufacturing agglomeration patterns. He studies trends in county manufacturing employment growth in counties that border other counties in another state. He documents that manufacturing employment growth has been larger on the state border featuring more lax labor regulation (Right to Work States).
In a similar spirit, we compare our income ratio for adjacent counties where the two counties lie in different states. In these regressions, the unit of analysis is a county: we take our zip-code level data and aggregate it up to the county level. The sample is the set of counties that are adjacent to a county in another state. For each county pair, we include a border-pair fixed effect. This matched-pair research design leads to counties that border more than one county in another state being included in the regression more than once; we cluster our standard errors to adjust for counties appearing multiple times in the regression. The bordered-pair fixed effect absorbs the average effect of common regional attributes that the counties share (e.g., common or similar labor markets or industrial mix). The estimated coefficients rely on within pair differences in the observable variables. In the case of the tax rate variable, these differences derive mainly from differences in state tax policy.
V. Results
Before turning to the regression results, a few observations from the summary statistics presented in Table 1 are helpful. The mean ratio of AGI per tax return to income per Census household is quite similar across the three samples (0.79 in the California zip code sample and 0.80 in the other two samples). While it is tempting to draw aggregate conclusions about tax sheltering from this simple mean, we caution against such conclusions for two reasons. First, many of the differences in reported income are not from behavioral decisions (e.g., the fact that Social Security benefits are excluded from AGI). Second, aggregate tax sheltering also depends on the number of tax returns filed per household. Some households will file multiple returns (e.g., parents and children file separately) and others will not be required to file at all. The mean number of tax returns per Census household is about 1.2 in each of the samples. While this ratio exceeding one is somewhat surprising given that some households do not file tax returns, the mean across this variable is not terribly instructive about the number of tax returns filed nationally since the mean is influenced by outliers (and the ratio is bounded below by zero). The median of this ratio is 1.15.
V.A. California Results
As a simple way of checking for spatial differences in tax sheltering, we present two figures that summarize the income ratio for California. Figure 1 maps the spatial distribution of our dependent variable for California zip codes. Substantial variation in this ratio is observed, though no simple pattern emerges from the map. Figure 2 takes a more aggregate approach to spatial patterns. Some of our regressions include county fixed effects, the estimates of which will reflect mean differences in tax sheltering across counties. Figure 2 maps the county fixed effects from a regression using the ballot propositions as a measure of political ideology. The map indicates coastal counties in the middle of the state (the greater San Francisco area) have lower tax sheltering rates.
As discussed above, we estimate several variants of our model for the California data. Table 2 reports the results for the California sample. The first two columns have results using the ballot propositions to measure political ideology; the last two columns use party-line voting, the Poole-Rosenthal factors, and voter turnout as measures of political ideology and engagement.
The other difference across columns is that the second and fourth columns include county level fixed effects to control for possible regional differences within California. 14 Controlling for county fixed effects, we exploit within-county variation in zip-code income ratios, demographics and politics.
In terms of political ideology, both specifications that employ the ballot propositions yield estimated coefficients that suggest that places with more support for higher taxes report relatively less income to the IRS (conditional on the income they report to the Census Bureau).
Thus, supporting tax increases and reporting more taxable income do not go hand-in-hand. The magnitude of the estimated effect varies depending on the inclusion of county level fixed effects with the estimated effect being almost four times higher (-0.49 vs. -0.13) in the specification with fixed effects. In the larger of these two cases, a one standard deviation increase in the measure of tax support for the ballot propositions increases the income ratio by slightly more than onequarter of a standard deviation.
As discussed above, while ballot initiative voting is obviously related to people's views of taxation, one concern is that the amount of sheltering that people undertake may influence their voting on ballot initiatives. That is, voting behavior may be endogenous to tax sheltering.
In fact, this endogeneity story is consistent with our results using the ballot initiatives: places that support the ballot initiatives also have more tax sheltering. A natural way to deal with this problem econometrically would be to employ an instrumental variables technique. However, a valid instrument needs to be correlated with ballot initiatives without having a direct effect on attitudes towards tax sheltering. Lacking a good instrument it is not possible to distinguish sort out the relationship between voting and tax sheltering. As an alternative strategy for measuring the effects on political attitudes on tax sheltering, we estimate specifications that include relatively general measures of political attitudes -as captured by party affiliation, voter turnout, and the Poole-Rosenthal measures of ideology. We argue that these measures might be less susceptible to reverse causation: while being able to shelter income from taxation might make someone more likely to vote in favor of higher taxes, the effect on general political ideology is probably smaller.
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 presents results from specifications that include party affiliation, voter turnout and the Poole-Rosenthal measures of ideology as proxies for political attitudes. Since we have multiple variables that measure the effects of political concerns, the results are somewhat tricky to interpret. Both specifications indicate that an increase in Republican voters is associated with a higher reported income ratio (less sheltering) and these results are statistically significant. However, the estimated effect of being in a
Congressional district with a more conservative member of Congress is negative and statistically significant. Based on the specification that includes the county fixed effects, the net effect of being in a place that is both one standard deviation more conservative and one standard deviation more Republican is that the income ratio is roughly 0.021 higher (less income sheltering). 15 In unreported regressions, we estimated separate models using party voting and the PooleRosenthal measures. The estimated coefficient on the Republican variable is positive (but not statistically significant) in a regression without the Poole-Rosenthal variables; the estimated coefficient on the first Poole-Rosenthal factor is negative (but not statistically significant) in a regression without the Republican variable. Our conclusion is that these variables are capturing different aspects of political ideology and that controlling for these different aspects is important for estimating the overall effect. Voter turnout does not have a statistically significant effect on tax sheltering.
In terms of tax policy, we do not include the marginal tax rate in these regressions since variation in the tax rate would be solely due to differences in income levels across places.
However, the regression includes the percentage of households who are self employed as a test of whether the self employed engage in more tax sheltering. With the exception of column (2), the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant. These estimates suggest that places with more self employed people also have more tax sheltering, consistent with the hypothesis that the self employed have more opportunities to shelter income from taxation.
Turning to demographics, several patterns emerge from the results that are consistent across specifications. First, having more people own their own homes reduces the reported income ratio. While home ownership creates a form of income (i.e., imputed rent) that is not captured by AGI (which would suggest that home ownership is a form of tax sheltering), this story seems implausible since the Census definition is unlikely to capture imputed rent. Another possibility is that home ownership is correlated with aspects of the income distribution that are not completely controlled for by the income controls. For example, homeownership increases with income so that a larger fraction of households in areas with high homeownership also file taxes; if places with more non-filers have a higher reported income ratio (because the Census average income reflects the lower income households but the IRS data does not), then this indirect effect could explain the result.
Second, places with more households with heads over the age of 60 also have less tax
sheltering. This result is somewhat surprising given that a substantial fraction of Social Security income is excluded from adjusted gross income (which would show up as a form of unintentional tax sheltering).
Third, minorities appear to shelter more income from taxation (though this result is not statistically significant for Hispanics in the specification with county fixed effects). The regressions include income controls based on the fraction of households in different income ranges; however, if these controls do not completely capture the effects of income distribution on reporting, then the demographic variables might be picking up differences in the need to file tax returns. For example, if a zip code has an unusually high number of non-tax-filers, its average AGI may appear high relative to its Census income because the Census includes more low income households than the IRS data.
Fourth, the amount of sheltering decreases with the level of education of the head of household: places with more people with advanced degrees tend to report more income to the IRS relative to what they tell the Census. One possible explanation for this result is that, controlling for income, more highly-educated people tend to have jobs with more informational reporting which makes tax evasion more difficult.
V.B. National Zip Code Level Results
Moving beyond California, we can estimate a national sample in which we include the Poole-Rosenthal ideology measures and voter turnout. Table 3 provides results from an ordinary least squares regression using the national sample of zip codes. 16 The estimated effect of being in a more conservative Congressional district on the reported income ratio is positive (0.0063), 16 Since most of the variation in the tax rate variable comes from comparisons across states and the political ideology variation comes from across Congressional districts, we do not report a specification with state fixed effects since such fixed effects would absorb much of the variation in the data that we are relying on for identification. Predictably, such a specification leads to imprecise estimates on the variables of interest.
though only at the 90% significance level). A one standard deviation increase in first PooleRosenthal factor is associated with a 0.0027 increase in the reported income ratio; this effect is an order of magnitude smaller than the net effect of a California zip code being both more conservative and more Republican. Unlike the California results in which voter turnout did not have a statistically significant impact on tax sheltering, places with higher voter turnout tend to have more tax sheltering. With respect to demographics, the national sample results are broadly consistent with the results reported for California. Table 3 also provides our first evidence on the effects of tax rates on tax sheltering. The estimated coefficient on the state marginal tax rate is -0.0020 and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. A two percentage point increase in the state marginal tax rate decreases the reported income ratio by 0.0040, which is about one-half of a percent of the average income ratio. We return to the economic significance of the estimated tax effects in our discussion of the county border pair results.
V.C. National County Border Pairs Results Table 4 reports results from estimating equation (1) with data from border pairs of counties. These regressions include a fixed effect for each border pair. By including this border pair fixed effect, we seek to exploit within border pair variation in state tax rates, political variables, and demographics to tease out effects on the tax income ratio. We report two specifications. The first specification only has the marginal tax rate and the political variables, under the assumption that the border pair fixed effects control for other factors. The second specification (which turns out to be our preferred specification) includes the covariates used in the zip code level analysis.
In both specifications, the estimated effect of state income tax rates on the income ratio is negative: counties in high tax states have more tax sheltering than adjacent counties located in low tax states. Using the specification with the full set of demographics, the results indicate that a two percentage point increase in the tax rate decreases the income ratio by 0.0054 (i.e., 2 * 0.0027). To convert this into something akin to a price elasticity, consider that the "tax price" of behavior is one minus the tax rate. If someone starts with an overall income tax rate of 20 percent (Federal plus state), they start with a tax price of 0.80. An increase in the state marginal tax rate that increases the tax rate to 22 percent lowers the tax price to 0.78. Thus, a 2.5% decrease in the tax price causes a 0.68 percent (i.e., 0.0054 divided by the mean income ratio of 0.79) decrease in reported income -an elasticity of reported income of 0.27 (i.e., 0.68/2.5) with respect to the tax price. Relative to overall taxable income elasticities (see discussion in Chetty, 2008) , this elasticity of tax sheltering is on the lower end of the reported range. However, since the overall taxable income elasticity is the sum of the elasticity of tax sheltering with respect to the tax price and the elasticity of economic income with respect to the tax price, this result suggests that sheltering plays a large role in the overall taxable income elasticity.
In terms of the estimated effects of the other factors, most of the estimated effects are consistent with the results reported in the previous tables. The exceptions to this pattern are the estimated effects of self employment and home ownership, which are no longer statistically significant.
VI. Conclusion
Tax sheltering activity has important public policy implications because government revenue collection hinges on whether tax payers engage in this activity. Since tax sheltering encompasses both legal activity (tax avoidance) and illegal activity (tax evasion), empiricists have faced fundamental data challenges that have limited their ability to study these phenomena.
In this paper, we have used two independent residential zip-code level data sets that have enabled us to test several hypotheses concerning tax avoidance behavior.
Our maintained assumption throughout this paper is that households accurately report their incomes to the Census. Our justification for this assumption is that households have no economic incentive to systematically misreport this information. Under the assumption that households truthfully report their incomes to the Census, then the ratio of reported income to the Internal Revenue Service divided by reported income to the Census provided a metric of tax sheltering activity at the zip-code level. In our empirical work, we have used this ratio as our key dependent variable. Based on this variable, we have documented four main facts: (1) liberal communities engage in more tax avoidance than the average community; (2) higher tax rates encourage more tax sheltering; (3) consistent with the idea that the self employed have more opportunities for tax sheltering, we find that the self employed do indeed report relatively less income to the IRS than other households (conditional on what they report to the Census); and (4) certain demographic groups such as the young and minorities engage in more tax sheltering behavior; however, more highly-educated households engage in less tax sheltering.
While the results related to tax policy -the tax rate effects and the self employment effect -are quite consistent with standard predictions from public finance, the results from the political
and demographic variables open up a host of questions about the mechanism that is at work.
One question that we cannot resolve with our data is the question of tax avoidance versus tax evasion. Another issue is whether opportunities to shelter taxes differ across groups or whether some groups are more aggressive in seeking out such opportunities. Does social capital or other ideas of social identity play a role in tax sheltering decisions? Furthermore, the relationships between the variables could be driven by measurement issues (e.g., the fact that the IRS does not have income for households that are not required to file tax returns) that do not have any direct behavioral implications. We hope to see future research that helps sort through these issues. Table Notes : For the California zip code sample there are 1,607 observations. In the national sample there are 31,075 observations and in the county border pair sample there are 1,142 observations. The summary statistics are weighted by the number of households in the zip code (or county in the county border pair sample). Table Notes : All of the regressions are based on 1607 observations. The regressions are weighted by the number of households in the zip code. The regressions include the percent of households in 15 different income ranges and a constant. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors (clustered at the county level) are reported in parentheses. Table Notes: The regression is based on 31,075 observations. The regression is weighted by the number of households in the zip code. The regression includes the percent of households in 15 different income ranges and a constant. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors (clustered by state) are reported in parentheses. 
